Authorization Contract v1

Normative rules governing which actors may trigger agent dispatch.

This document is the single living contract for authorization policy. The historical decision and rationale are recorded in ADR 0054. The NormalizedEvent v1 specification defines the actor.role field consumed by this contract.

Role ordering

Fullsend uses a forge-neutral role hierarchy. Roles are listed from most to least privileged:

admin > maintain > write > triage > read > none > external

Role	Meaning
admin	Full repository control
maintain	Repository settings without destructive admin
write	Push, label, comment, merge
triage	Label and moderate without push access
read	Read-only collaborator
none	Authenticated user without explicit repository permission
external	Actor outside the repository or project (currently Jira-only; GitHub/GitLab map non-collaborators to none)

Forge-native permission mapping

Forge	Native level	Fullsend role
GitHub	admin	admin
	maintain	maintain
	write	write
	triage	triage
	read	read
	(no collaborator entry)	none
	(fork/non-collaborator)	none
GitLab	Owner	admin
	Maintainer	maintain
	Developer	write
	Reporter	triage
	Guest	read
Jira	Administrators	admin
	Developers	write
	(other named role)	read
	(no project membership)	external

On GitHub the mapping source is the collaborator permission API (GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/collaborators/{username}/permission), which returns the user's effective role including inherited org grants regardless of membership visibility. Fork authors and non-collaborators whose role_name is unrecognized by MapGitHubPermission are mapped to none (not external); the external role is currently produced only by the Jira adapter for actors without project membership. Both none and external are denied by the default thresholds, so the authorization outcome is identical. The author_association field is not used because it does not correctly reflect private org membership (see Excluded fields).

On Jira the mapping source is the project's role membership roster, resolved once per poll cycle for the configured --jira-project. An actor is matched by Jira account ID. Role names are matched case-insensitively against the names above; unrecognized role names fall through to read. Actors with no membership in the configured project — or whose issue belongs to a different project — are mapped to external (fail-closed). See the Jira integration guide for details on the name-based matching limitation.

Default thresholds

Category	Minimum role	Rationale
Observation (triage, review)	triage	Read-only analysis; lower barrier to reduce maintainer toil
Mutation (code, fix, retro slash command, prioritize)	write	Agents that push commits or alter state require push access

A role satisfies a threshold when it is at or above the minimum in the role ordering. For example, admin satisfies both triage and write thresholds.

The bash dispatch implementation uses a parameterized has_repo_permission(username, min) helper that encodes this comparison (see Enforcement point).

Implementation note: the Go dispatch path (IsAuthorized() in harnessdispatch) currently uses a coarse write+ filter for all non-exception transitions — it does not yet distinguish observation from mutation thresholds. Poll-based dispatch (GitLab/Jira) uses the Go path, so a triage-role user triggering observation through that path is denied today. The bash path (GitHub webhook dispatch) implements the full parameterized threshold.

Fail-closed behavior

The authorization gate is fail-closed: when a role cannot be determined, the actor is denied.

The entity-discovery rows below specify the future ADR 0098 path and do not describe behavior currently implemented by fullsend dispatch or fullsend poll.

Condition	Outcome
Collaborator API returns an unrecognized role_name	Mapped to none; denied
Collaborator API returns an error or times out	Denied (function returns failure)
Custom repository roles (GitHub)	Mapped to none; denied until custom roles are handled platform-wide
actor.role is empty or missing	Event fails NormalizedEvent validation; never reaches dispatch
Username is empty	Denied
Fullsend poll invocation provenance is missing or unverifiable	Entity discovery denied
Harness entity sources are missing or malformed	That harness is skipped for scheduled evaluation
Effective platform eligibility policy is missing, malformed, or unverifiable	Scheduled evaluations governed by that policy are denied
Effective platform eligibility policy uses a wildcard without explicit platform-level justification	Scheduled evaluations governed by that policy are denied
Action-indicating enumeration fails, is unavailable, or does not cover the entity kind	Evaluation of that entity is denied
Current permission for an action-indicating element's actor is missing or unverifiable	That element cannot trigger execution
Current permission for an action-indicating element's actor is below the applicable stage threshold	That element cannot trigger execution
Versioned normalized-entity contract is missing or incomplete	Entity-first execution denied

Exceptions

Certain transitions are authorized without requiring a write or triage role from the acting user. Each exception is documented with its rationale.

Label application (GitHub)

When source.system is github, transition.kind is label_changed, and label.action is added, the event is authorized regardless of actor.role. This exception applies only when source.system is github. GitHub's own permission model requires at least triage access to apply a label, so label application is an implicit authorization gate. Bot accounts that apply labels as part of agent-to-agent handoff (e.g., adding ready-to-code after triage completes) rely on this path because the collaborator API often returns 404 for [bot] accounts even when the GitHub App has write access via its installation token.

Bot-submitted reviews (GitHub)

When source.system is github, transition.kind is review_submitted, and actor.kind is bot, the event is authorized regardless of actor.role. This exception applies only when source.system is github. This allows the review agent's bot identity to trigger downstream stages (e.g., the fix agent) without a collaborator role lookup. The downstream harness CEL trigger constrains which bot and review state are accepted.

Lifecycle close (pull_request_target.closed)

The pull_request_target.closed event that triggers the retro stage is intentionally ungated: any closer may trigger read-only lifecycle accounting. The retro agent performs only observation work and does not mutate repository state. This exception is currently implemented in the bash dispatch path; the Go IsAuthorized() path has no special handling for closed transitions and applies the standard write+ gate.

Schedule and manual dispatch

When source.system is schedule or manual, the actor is the configured service identity (GitHub App bot or workflow GITHUB_ACTOR). Adapters set actor.kind to bot and actor.role to the effective permission of that identity on the target repository (typically write for installed apps). The standard authorization gate applies; the platform does not default schedule or manual actors to role: none.

Fullsend-originated entity discovery

This is the future path adopted by ADR 0098; it is not yet implemented by fullsend dispatch or fullsend poll, and entity-first execution MUST NOT be enabled until the versioned normalized-entity contract defines CEL-eligible and prompt-eligible fields. That contract is a platform allowlist; a harness may request fewer fields but cannot expand it.

fullsend poll may perform scheduled entity discovery without synthesizing a NormalizedEvent or event actor. This path is authorized only when its caller has trusted Fullsend-controlled invocation provenance: a verified, non-user-assertable platform execution identity bound to the invocation and its target, such as an attested workflow/job identity or installation credential. A CLI flag, request header, or other caller-supplied claim is insufficient. A caller that cannot establish that provenance MUST be denied. Wildcard eligibility (* or all) requires the same explicit platform-level justification as any other wildcard allowlist in this contract.

Authorization of the poll origin does not authorize entity content. For each candidate harness, before evaluating its CEL predicate, Fullsend MUST enumerate a platform-defined closed superset of action-indicating elements for the entity kind. These are actor-originated entity-history elements whose content or state could be treated as a request for a stage to run; the superset includes issue or change-proposal bodies, comments, reviews, and label applications wherever the entity kind supports them. A harness cannot exclude a supported category from classification. If enumeration fails, is unavailable, or does not cover the entity kind, evaluation of that entity MUST be denied; only successful enumeration may return an empty set for a state-only predicate.

Fullsend MUST resolve the current forge permission level for every enumerated element's actor and remove the element unless that permission meets the candidate harness's observation or mutation threshold. Historical or cached actor relationships are insufficient. A harness CEL predicate MAY further restrict selection using retained elements and their current actor-permission fields, but cannot weaken the platform gate or be relied upon to identify an element for later authorization.

Fullsend MUST omit or minimize other unneeded untrusted fields where the normalized entity contract permits, while retaining the state, content, and actor provenance required by the harness. Further trust or injection filtering MAY run after CEL routing and before the harness pre-script. Retained content remains untrusted throughout. Any resulting agent run uses the harness's configured identity and permissions.

Excluded fields

The following fields are not authorization evidence and must not be used for dispatch gating:

Field	Why excluded
author_association	Does not reflect private org membership; an org admin with private membership gets CONTRIBUTOR instead of MEMBER (github/gh-aw-mcpg#2862). Also reflects contribution history, not current authority.
Contribution history	Past contributions do not confer current repository permissions. A former maintainer whose access was revoked should not pass authorization.
actor.is_entity_author	Being the author of an issue or PR does not grant repository permissions. This field supports routing decisions in CEL triggers, not authorization.

Principle: relationship and contribution-history fields are not evidence of current authority. Event-backed authorization must be derived from the forge's permission model at event time, not from cached or inferred relationships. Fullsend-originated entity discovery must instead be authorized from trusted Fullsend-controlled invocation provenance for enumeration and evaluation. Action-indicating elements are separately gated by current actor permission; historical actors and relationship fields must not serve as authorization evidence.

Enforcement point

Authorization is enforced as a platform-level gate before CEL trigger evaluation. Event-backed dispatch uses the normalized event actor; Fullsend-originated entity discovery uses trusted invocation provenance to authorize enumeration and evaluation, then independently filters action-indicating elements by current actor permission before CEL.

Forge event
  --> NormalizedEvent (adapter)
  --> Event-actor authorization gate        <-- enforced here
  --> CEL trigger evaluation (harness routing)
  --> Execution

Fullsend poll invocation
  --> Trusted-origin authorization gate     <-- enforced here
  --> Entity enumeration and resolution
  --> For each candidate harness:
      --> Enumerate action-indicating elements
      --> Harness-stage actor gate           <-- enforced here
      --> CEL trigger evaluation (event is null)
      --> Further trust/injection filtering
      --> Execution

CEL triggers: routing only

Harness trigger expressions express routing and may tighten input selection, not platform permission policy. A CEL expression may tighten dispatch conditions (e.g., require a specific label, restrict to non-fork PRs, filter by bot identity) but may never weaken the platform authorization gate. On the event-backed path, an event that fails authorization never reaches CEL evaluation.

This separation is enforced architecturally: on the event-backed path, IsAuthorized() runs before MatchHarnesses() in the dispatch core. On the entity-discovery path, the trusted-origin gate runs before enumeration and CEL evaluation. For each candidate harness, the platform removes unauthorized action-indicating elements using that harness's stage threshold before its CEL predicate runs, and event remains null. Neither path lets a CEL expression override or relax an authorization denial.

Per-repo configurability

The authorization gate is a platform-level security boundary. Individual repositories cannot disable it. Per-repo configuration (which stages are enabled, which labels trigger automation) operates within the authorization boundary. A repository can disable a stage entirely but cannot make it available to unauthorized users.

A future per-repo configuration system that needs to customize authorization rules (e.g., allowing triage for a mutation stage) should extend the has_repo_permission helper's allowed permission list, not bypass the gate.

Versioning

This is a living normative document under ADR 0015. Breaking changes require docs/normative/authorization/v2/.

Change	v1 impact
Breaking (requires v2): remove a role from the hierarchy, raise a default threshold, remove a documented exception, change fail-closed to fail-open	Dispatch implementations must migrate
Non-breaking (allowed in v1): add a role, lower a default threshold, add a new exception, add forge mappings, clarify documentation	Existing dispatch behavior is preserved or relaxed